NAME
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback
,
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh
,
SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback
,
SSL_set_tmp_dh
—
handle DH keys for ephemeral key
exchange
SYNOPSIS
#include
<openssl/ssl.h>
void
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback
(SSL_CTX
*ctx, DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength));
long
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh
(SSL_CTX
*ctx, DH *dh);
void
SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback
(SSL
*ssl, DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength);
long
SSL_set_tmp_dh
(SSL
*ssl, DH *dh);
DESCRIPTION
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback
()
sets the callback function for ctx to be used when a
DH parameters are required to tmp_dh_callback. The
callback is inherited by all ssl objects created from
ctx.
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh
()
sets DH parameters to be used to be
dh. The key is
inherited by all ssl objects created from
ctx.
SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback
()
sets the callback only for ssl.
SSL_set_tmp_dh
()
sets the parameters only for ssl.
These functions apply to SSL/TLS servers only.
NOTES
When using a cipher with RSA authentication, an ephemeral DH key exchange can take place. Ciphers with DSA keys always use ephemeral DH keys as well. In these cases, the session data are negotiated using the ephemeral/temporary DH key and the key supplied and certified by the certificate chain is only used for signing. Anonymous ciphers (without a permanent server key) also use ephemeral DH keys.
Using ephemeral DH key exchange yields forward secrecy, as the connection can only be decrypted when the DH key is known. By generating a temporary DH key inside the server application that is lost when the application is left, it becomes impossible for an attacker to decrypt past sessions, even if he gets hold of the normal (certified) key, as this key was only used for signing.
In order to perform a DH key exchange
the server must use a DH group (DH parameters) and generate a DH key. The
server will always generate a new DH key during the negotiation, when the DH
parameters are supplied via callback and/or when the
SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
option of
SSL_CTX_set_options(3) is set. It will immediately create a
DH key, when DH parameters are supplied via
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh
()
and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
is not set. In this case,
it may happen that a key is generated on initialization without later being
needed, while on the other hand the computer time during the negotiation is
being saved.
If “strong” primes were used to generate the DH
parameters, it is not strictly necessary to generate a new key for each
handshake but it does improve forward secrecy. If it is not assured that
“strong” primes were used (see especially the section about
DSA parameters below), SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
must be
used in order to prevent small subgroup attacks. Always using
SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
has an impact on the computer
time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so application
authors/users should consider always enabling this option.
As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an
application should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the
parameters. DH parameters can be reused, as the actual key is newly
generated during the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH parameters is that
an attacker may specialize on a very often used DH group. Applications
should therefore generate their own DH parameters during the installation
process using the openssl
openssl(1) application. In order to reduce the computer time needed
for this generation, it is possible to use DSA parameters instead (see
openssl(1)), but in this case
SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
is mandatory.
Application authors may compile in DH parameters. Files
dh512.pem, dh1024.pem,
dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem
in the apps directory of the current version of the
OpenSSL distribution contain the ‘SKIP’ DH parameters, which
use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly. These files
can be converted into C code using the -C
option of
the openssl(1) application. Authors may also generate their own set of
parameters using
openssl(1), but a user may not be sure how the parameters were
generated. The generation of DH parameters during installation is therefore
recommended.
An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or can supply the DH parameters via a callback function. The callback approach has the advantage that the callback may supply DH parameters for different key lengths.
The tmp_dh_callback is called with the keylength needed and the is_export information. The is_export flag is set when the ephemeral DH key exchange is performed with an export cipher.
RETURN VALUES
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback
() and
SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback
() do not return diagnostic
output.
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh
() and
SSL_set_tmp_dh
() do return 1 on success and 0 on
failure. Check the error queue to find out the reason of failure.
EXAMPLES
Handle DH parameters for key lengths of 512 and 1024 bits. (Error handling partly left out.)
... /* Set up ephemeral DH stuff */ DH *dh_512 = NULL; DH *dh_1024 = NULL; FILE *paramfile; ... /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_512.pem -2 512" */ paramfile = fopen("dh_param_512.pem", "r"); if (paramfile) { dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL); fclose(paramfile); } /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_1024.pem -2 1024" */ paramfile = fopen("dh_param_1024.pem", "r"); if (paramfile) { dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL); fclose(paramfile); } ... /* "openssl dhparam -C -2 512" etc... */ DH *get_dh512() { ... } DH *get_dh1024() { ... } DH * tmp_dh_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength) { DH *dh_tmp=NULL; switch (keylength) { case 512: if (!dh_512) dh_512 = get_dh512(); dh_tmp = dh_512; break; case 1024: if (!dh_1024) dh_1024 = get_dh1024(); dh_tmp = dh_1024; break; default: /* * Generating a key on the fly is very costly, * so use what is there */ setup_dh_parameters_like_above(); } return(dh_tmp); }
SEE ALSO
openssl(1), ssl(3), SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(3), SSL_CTX_set_options(3), SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)