pf.conf —
packet filter configuration file
The
pf(4) packet filter modifies,
drops, or passes packets according to rules or definitions specified in
pf.conf.
This is an overview of the sections in this manual page:
- PACKET
FILTERING
- including network address translation (NAT).
- OPTIONS
- globally tune the behaviour of the packet filtering engine.
- QUEUEING
- provides rule-based bandwidth and traffic control.
- TABLES
- provide a method for dealing with large numbers of addresses.
- ANCHORS
- are containers for rules and tables.
- STATEFUL
FILTERING
- tracks packets by state.
- TRAFFIC
NORMALISATION
- includes scrub, fragment handling, and blocking spoofed traffic.
- OPERATING
SYSTEM FINGERPRINTING
- is a method for detecting a host's operating system.
- EXAMPLES
- provides some example rulesets.
- GRAMMAR
- provides a complete BNF grammar reference.
The current line can be extended over multiple lines using a backslash
(‘\’). Comments can be put anywhere in the file using a hash
mark (‘#’), and extend to the end of the current line. Care
should be taken when commenting out multi-line text: the comment is effective
until the end of the entire block.
Argument names not beginning with a letter, digit, or underscore must be quoted.
Additional configuration files can be included with the
include keyword, for example:
include "/etc/pf/sub.filter.conf"
Macros can be defined that will later be expanded in context. Macro names must
start with a letter, digit, or underscore, and may contain any of those
characters. Macro names may not be reserved words (for example
pass,
in,
out). Macros are not expanded inside
quotes.
For example:
ext_if = "kue0"
all_ifs = "{" $ext_if lo0 "}"
pass out on $ext_if from any to any
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 25
pf(4) has the ability to
block,
pass, and
match packets based on attributes of their
layer 3 and layer 4 headers. Filter rules determine which of these actions are
taken; filter parameters specify the packets to which a rule applies.
Each time a packet processed by the packet filter comes in on or goes out
through an interface, the filter rules are evaluated in sequential order, from
first to last. For
block and
pass, the last matching rule decides what
action is taken; if no rule matches the packet, the default action is to pass
the packet without creating a state. For
match, rules are evaluated every time they
match; the pass/block state of a packet remains unchanged.
Most parameters are optional. If a parameter is specified, the rule only applies
to packets with matching attributes. The matching for some parameters can be
inverted with the
! operator. Certain
parameters can be expressed as lists, in which case
pfctl(8) generates all needed
rule combinations.
By default
pf(4) filters packets
statefully: the first time a packet matches a
pass rule, a state entry is created. The
packet filter examines each packet to see if it matches an existing state. If
it does, the packet is passed without evaluation of any rules. After the
connection is closed or times out, the state entry is automatically removed.
The following actions can be used in the filter:
-
-
block
- The packet is blocked. There are a number of ways in which a
block rule can behave when blocking a
packet. The default behaviour is to
drop packets silently, however this can
be overridden or made explicit either globally, by setting the
block-policy option, or on a per-rule
basis with one of the following options:
drop
- The packet is silently dropped.
return
- This causes a TCP RST to be returned for TCP packets and an ICMP
UNREACHABLE for other types of packets.
return-icmp
-
return-icmp6
- This causes ICMP messages to be returned for packets which match the
rule. By default this is an ICMP UNREACHABLE message, however this can
be overridden by specifying a message as a code or number.
return-rst
- This applies only to TCP packets, and issues a TCP RST which closes
the connection. An optional parameter,
ttl, may be given with a TTL
value.
Options returning ICMP packets currently have no effect if
pf(4) operates on a
bridge(4), as the code to
support this feature has not yet been implemented.
The simplest mechanism to block everything by default and only pass packets
that match explicit rules is specify a first filter rule of:
block all
-
-
match
- The packet is matched. This mechanism is used to provide fine grained
filtering without altering the block/pass state of a packet.
match rules differ from
block and
pass rules in that parameters are set
every time a packet matches the rule, not only on the last matching rule.
For the following parameters, this means that the parameter effectively
becomes “sticky” until explicitly overridden:
nat-to,
binat-to,
rdr-to,
queue,
rtable, and
scrub.
log is different still, in that the
action happens every time a rule matches i.e. a single packet can get
logged more than once.
-
-
pass
- The packet is passed; state is created unless the
no state option is specified.
The following parameters can be used in the filter:
-
-
in
or out
- A packet always comes in on, or goes out through, one interface.
in and
out apply to incoming and outgoing
packets; if neither are specified, the rule will match packets in both
directions.
-
-
log
(all |
matches |
to
interface |
user)
- In addition to any action specified, log the packet. Only the packet that
establishes the state is logged, unless the
no
state option is specified. The logged packets are sent to a
pflog(4) interface, by
default pflog0; pflog0 is monitored by
the pflogd(8) logging daemon
which logs to the file /var/log/pflog
in pcap(3) binary format.
The keywords all,
matches,
to, and
user are optional and can be combined
using commas, but must be enclosed in parentheses if given.
Use all to force logging of all packets
for a connection. This is not necessary when
no state is explicitly specified.
If matches is specified, it logs the
packet on all subsequent matching rules. It is often combined with
to
interface to avoid adding noise to the
default log file.
The keyword user logs the UID and PID of
the socket on the local host used to send or receive a packet, in addition
to the normal information.
To specify a logging interface other than
pflog0, use the syntax
to
interface.
-
-
quick
- If a packet matches a rule which has the
quick option set, this rule is
considered the last matching rule, and evaluation of subsequent rules is
skipped.
-
-
on
interface |
any
- This rule applies only to packets coming in on, or going out through, this
particular interface or interface group. For more information on interface
groups, see the
group keyword in
ifconfig(8).
any will match any existing interface
except loopback ones.
-
-
on
rdomain number
- This rule applies only to packets coming in on, or going out through, this
particular routing domain.
-
-
inet
|
inet6
- This rule applies only to packets of this address family.
-
-
proto
protocol
- This rule applies only to packets of this protocol. Common protocols are
ICMP, ICMP6, TCP, and UDP. For a list of all the protocol name to number
mappings used by pfctl(8),
see the file /etc/protocols.
-
-
from
source
port
source
os
source
to dest
port
dest
- This rule applies only to packets with the specified source and
destination addresses and ports.
Addresses can be specified in CIDR notation (matching netblocks), as
symbolic host names, interface names or interface group names, or as any
of the following keywords:
any
- Any address.
no-route
- Any address which is not currently routable.
route
label
- Any address matching the given
route(8)
label.
self
- Expands to all addresses assigned to all interfaces.
- <table>
- Any address matching the given
table.
urpf-failed
- Any source address that fails a unicast reverse path forwarding (URPF)
check, i.e. packets coming in on an interface other than that which
holds the route back to the packet's source address.
Ranges of addresses are specified using the ‘-’ operator. For
instance: “10.1.1.10 - 10.1.1.12” means all addresses from
10.1.1.10 to 10.1.1.12, hence addresses 10.1.1.10, 10.1.1.11, and
10.1.1.12.
Interface names, interface group names, and
self can have modifiers appended:
:0
- Do not include interface aliases.
:broadcast
- Translates to the interface's broadcast address(es).
:network
- Translates to the network(s) attached to the interface.
:peer
- Translates to the point-to-point interface's peer address(es).
Host names may also have the :0 modifier
appended to restrict the name resolution to the first of each v4 and v6
address found.
Host name resolution and interface to address translation are done at
ruleset load-time. When the address of an interface (or host name) changes
(under DHCP or PPP, for instance), the ruleset must be reloaded for the
change to be reflected in the kernel. Surrounding the interface name (and
optional modifiers) in parentheses changes this behaviour. When the
interface name is surrounded by parentheses, the rule is automatically
updated whenever the interface changes its address. The ruleset does not
need to be reloaded. This is especially useful with NAT.
Ports can be specified either by number or by name. For example, port 80 can
be specified as www. For a list of all
port name to number mappings used by
pfctl(8), see the file
/etc/services.
Ports and ranges of ports are specified using these operators:
= (equal)
!= (unequal)
< (less than)
<= (less than or equal)
> (greater than)
>= (greater than or equal)
: (range including boundaries)
>< (range excluding boundaries)
<> (except range)
‘><’, ‘<>’ and ‘:’ are
binary operators (they take two arguments). For instance:
-
-
port
2000:2004
- means ‘all ports ≥ 2000 and ≤ 2004’, hence
ports 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004.
-
-
port
2000 >< 2004
- means ‘all ports > 2000 and < 2004’, hence ports
2001, 2002, and 2003.
-
-
port
2000 <> 2004
- means ‘all ports < 2000 or > 2004’, hence ports
1–1999 and 2005–65535.
The operating system of the source host can be specified in the case of TCP
rules with the os modifier. See the
OPERATING
SYSTEM FINGERPRINTING section for more information.
The host,
port, and
os specifications are optional, as in
the following examples:
pass in all
pass in from any to any
pass in proto tcp from any port < 1024 to any
pass in proto tcp from any to any port 25
pass in proto tcp from 10.0.0.0/8 port >= 1024 \
to ! 10.1.2.3 port != ssh
pass in proto tcp from any os "OpenBSD"
pass in proto tcp from route "DTAG"
The following additional parameters can be used in the filter:
all
- This is equivalent to ‘
from any to
any’.
allow-opts
- By default, packets with IPv4 options or IPv6 hop-by-hop or destination
options header are blocked. When
allow-opts is specified for a
pass rule, packets that pass the filter
based on that rule (last matching) do so even if they contain options. For
packets that match state, the rule that initially created the state is
used. The implicit pass rule, that is used when a packet does not match
any rules, does not allow IP options or option headers. Note that IPv6
packets with type 0 routing headers are always dropped.
divert-packet
port port
- Used to send matching packets to
divert(4) sockets bound to
port port. If the default option of
fragment reassembly is enabled, scrubbing with
reassemble tcp is also enabled for
divert-packet rules.
divert-reply
- Used to receive replies for sockets that are bound to addresses which are
not local to the machine. See
setsockopt(2) for
information on how to bind these sockets.
divert-to
host
port
port
- Used to redirect packets to a local socket bound to
host and
port. The packets will not be modified,
so getsockname(2) on
the socket will return the original destination address of the packet.
flags
a/b |
any
- This rule only applies to TCP packets that have the flags
a set out of set
b. Flags not specified in
b are ignored. For stateful connections,
the default is
flags S/SA. To indicate
that flags should not be checked at all, specify
flags any. The flags are: (F)IN, (S)YN,
(R)ST, (P)USH, (A)CK, (U)RG, (E)CE, and C(W)R.
-
-
flags
S/S
- Flag SYN is set. The other flags are ignored.
-
-
flags
S/SA
- This is the default setting for stateful connections. Out of SYN and
ACK, exactly SYN may be set. SYN, SYN+PSH, and SYN+RST match, but
SYN+ACK, ACK, and ACK+RST do not. This is more restrictive than the
previous example.
-
-
flags
/SFRA
- If the first set is not specified, it defaults to none. All of SYN,
FIN, RST, and ACK must be unset.
Because flags S/SA is applied by default
(unless no state is specified), only
the initial SYN packet of a TCP handshake will create a state for a TCP
connection. It is possible to be less restrictive, and allow state
creation from intermediate (non-SYN) packets, by specifying
flags any. This will cause
pf(4) to synchronize to existing
connections, for instance if one flushes the state table. However, states
created from such intermediate packets may be missing connection details
such as the TCP window scaling factor. States which modify the packet
flow, such as those affected by af-to,
modulate state,
nat-to,
rdr-to, or
synproxy state options, or scrubbed
with reassemble tcp, will also not be
recoverable from intermediate packets. Such connections will stall and
time out.
group
group
- Similar to
user, this rule only applies
to packets of sockets owned by the specified
group.
icmp-type
type
code
code
-
icmp6-type
type
code
code
- This rule only applies to ICMP or ICMP6 packets with the specified type
and code. Text names for ICMP types and codes are listed in
icmp(4) and
icmp6(4). The protocol and
the ICMP type indicator (
icmp-type or
icmp6-type) must match.
label
string
- Adds a label to the rule, which can be used to identify the rule. For
instance, ‘
pfctl -s labels’ shows
per-rule statistics for rules that have labels.
The following macros can be used in labels:
- $dstaddr
- The destination IP address.
- $dstport
- The destination port specification.
- $if
- The interface.
- $nr
- The rule number.
- $proto
- The protocol name.
- $srcaddr
- The source IP address.
- $srcport
- The source port specification.
For example:
ips = "{ 1.2.3.4, 1.2.3.5 }"
pass in proto tcp from any to $ips \
port > 1023 label "$dstaddr:$dstport"
Expands to:
pass in inet proto tcp from any to 1.2.3.4 \
port > 1023 label "1.2.3.4:>1023"
pass in inet proto tcp from any to 1.2.3.5 \
port > 1023 label "1.2.3.5:>1023"
The macro expansion for the label
directive occurs only at configuration file parse time, not during
runtime.
max-pkt-rate
number/seconds
- Measure the rate of packets matching the rule and states created by it.
When the specified rate is exceeded, the rule stops matching. Only packets
in the direction in which the state was created are considered, so that
typically requests are counted and replies are not. For example, to pass
up to 100 ICMP packets per 10 seconds:
block in proto icmp
pass in proto icmp max-pkt-rate 100/10
When the rate is exceeded, all ICMP is blocked until the rate falls below
100 per 10 seconds again.
once
- Creates a one shot rule that will remove itself from an active ruleset
after the first match. In case this is the only rule in the anchor, the
anchor will be destroyed automatically after the rule is matched.
probability
number%
- A probability attribute can be attached to a rule, with a value set
between 0 and 100%, in which case the rule is honoured using the given
probability value. For example, the following rule will drop 20% of
incoming ICMP packets:
block in proto icmp probability
20%
prio
number
- Only match packets which have the given queueing priority assigned.
- [
!
]received-on
interface
- Only match packets which were received on the specified
interface (or interface group).
any will match any existing interface
except loopback ones.
rtable
number
- Used to select an alternate routing table for the routing lookup. Only
effective before the route lookup happened, i.e. when filtering inbound.
set
delay milliseconds
- Packets matching this rule will be delayed at the outbound interface by
the given number of milliseconds.
set
prio priority |
(priority,
priority)
- Packets matching this rule will be assigned a specific queueing priority.
Priorities are assigned as integers 0 through 7, with a default priority
of 3. If the packet is transmitted on a
vlan(4) interface, the
queueing priority will also be written as the priority code point in the
802.1Q VLAN header. If two priorities are given, TCP ACKs with no data
payload and packets which have a TOS of
lowdelay will be assigned to the second
one. Packets with a higher priority number are processed first, and
packets with the same priority are processed in the order in which they
are received.
For example:
pass in proto tcp to port 25 set prio 2
pass in proto tcp to port 22 set prio (2, 5)
The interface priority queues accessed by the
set prio keyword are always enabled and
do not require any additional configuration, unlike the queues described
below and in the QUEUEING
section.
set
queue queue |
(queue,
queue)
- Packets matching this rule will be assigned to the specified
queue. If two queues are given, packets
which have a TOS of
lowdelay and TCP
ACKs with no data payload will be assigned to the second one. See
QUEUEING for setup details.
For example:
pass in proto tcp to port 25 set queue mail
pass in proto tcp to port 22 set queue(ssh_bulk, ssh_prio)
set
tos string |
number
- Enforces a TOS for matching packets.
string may be one of
critical,
inetcontrol,
lowdelay,
netcontrol,
throughput,
reliability, or one of the DiffServ
Code Points: ef,
af11 ...
af43,
cs0 ...
cs7;
number may be either a hex or decimal
number.
tag
string
- Packets matching this rule will be tagged with the specified
string. The tag acts as an internal
marker that can be used to identify these packets later on. This can be
used, for example, to provide trust between interfaces and to determine if
packets have been processed by translation rules. Tags are
“sticky”, meaning that the packet will be tagged even if the
rule is not the last matching rule. Further matching rules can replace the
tag with a new one but will not remove a previously applied tag. A packet
is only ever assigned one tag at a time. Tags take the same macros as
labels (see above).
- [
!
]tagged
string
- Used with filter or translation rules to specify that packets must already
be tagged with the given string in order
to match the rule.
tos
string |
number
- This rule applies to packets with the specified TOS bits set.
string may be one of
critical,
inetcontrol,
lowdelay,
netcontrol,
throughput,
reliability, or one of the DiffServ
Code Points: ef,
af11 ...
af43,
cs0 ...
cs7;
number may be either a hex or decimal
number.
For example, the following rules are identical:
pass all tos lowdelay
pass all tos 0x10
pass all tos 16
user
user
- This rule only applies to packets of sockets owned by the specified
user. For outgoing connections initiated
from the firewall, this is the user that opened the connection. For
incoming connections to the firewall itself, this is the user that listens
on the destination port.
When listening sockets are bound to the wildcard address,
pf(4) cannot determine if a
connection is destined for the firewall itself. To avoid false matches on
just the destination port, combine a
user rule with source or destination
address self.
All packets, both outgoing and incoming, of one connection are associated
with the same user and group. Only TCP and UDP packets can be associated
with users.
The user and
group arguments refer to the effective
(as opposed to the real) IDs, in case the socket is created by a
setuid/setgid process. User and group IDs are stored when a socket is
created; when a process creates a listening socket as root (for instance,
by binding to a privileged port) and subsequently changes to another user
ID (to drop privileges), the credentials will remain root.
User and group IDs can be specified as either numbers or names. The syntax
is similar to the one for ports. The following example allows only
selected users to open outgoing connections:
block out proto tcp all
pass out proto tcp from self user { < 1000, dhartmei }
Translation options modify either the source or destination address and port of
the packets associated with a stateful connection.
pf(4) modifies the specified address
and/or port in the packet and recalculates IP, TCP, and UDP checksums as
necessary.
If specified on a
match rule, subsequent
rules will see packets as they look after any addresses and ports have been
translated. These rules will therefore have to filter based on the translated
address and port number.
The state entry created permits
pf(4)
to keep track of the original address for traffic associated with that state
and correctly direct return traffic for that connection.
Different types of translation are possible with pf:
-
-
af-to
- Translation between different address families (NAT64) is handled using
af-to rules. Because address family
translation overrides the routing table, it's only possible to use
af-to on inbound rules, and a source
address for the resulting translation must always be specified.
The optional second argument is the host or subnet the original addresses
are translated into for the destination. The lowest bits of the original
destination address form the host part of the new destination address
according to the specified subnet. It is possible to embed a complete IPv4
address into an IPv6 address using a network prefix of /96 or smaller.
When a destination address is not specified it is assumed that the host part
is 32-bit long. For IPv6 to IPv4 translation this would mean using only
the lower 32 bits of the original IPv6 destination address. For IPv4 to
IPv6 translation the destination subnet defaults to the subnet of the new
IPv6 source address with a prefix length of /96. See RFC 6052 Section 2.2
for details on how the prefix determines the destination address encoding.
For example, the following rules are identical:
pass in inet af-to inet6 from 2001:db8::1 to 2001:db8::/96
pass in inet af-to inet6 from 2001:db8::1
In the above example the matching IPv4 packets will be modified to have a
source address of 2001:db8::1 and a destination address will get prefixed
with 2001:db8::/96, e.g. 198.51.100.100 will be translated to
2001:db8::c633:6464.
In the reverse case the following rules are identical:
pass in inet6 from any to 64:ff9b::/96 af-to inet \
from 198.51.100.1 to 0.0.0.0/0
pass in inet6 from any to 64:ff9b::/96 af-to inet \
from 198.51.100.1
The destination IPv4 address is assumed to be embedded inside the original
IPv6 destination address, e.g. 64:ff9b::c633:6464 will be translated to
198.51.100.100.
The current implementation will only extract IPv4 addresses from the IPv6
addresses with a prefix length of /96 and greater.
-
-
binat-to
- A
binat-to rule specifies a
bidirectional mapping between an external IP netblock and an internal IP
netblock. It expands to an outbound
nat-to rule and an inbound
rdr-to rule.
-
-
nat-to
- A
nat-to option specifies that IP
addresses are to be changed as the packet traverses the given interface.
This technique allows one or more IP addresses on the translating host to
support network traffic for a larger range of machines on an
“inside” network. Although in theory any IP address can be
used on the inside, it is strongly recommended that one of the address
ranges defined by RFC 1918 be used. Those netblocks are:
10.0.0.0 – 10.255.255.255 (all of net 10, i.e. 10/8)
172.16.0.0 – 172.31.255.255 (i.e. 172.16/12)
192.168.0.0 – 192.168.255.255 (i.e. 192.168/16)
nat-to is usually applied outbound. If
applied inbound, nat-to to a local IP address is not supported.
-
-
rdr-to
- The packet is redirected to another destination and possibly a different
port.
rdr-to can optionally specify
port ranges instead of single ports. For instance:
-
-
- match in ... port 2000:2999 rdr-to ... port 4000
- redirects ports 2000 to 2999 (inclusive) to port 4000.
-
-
- match in ... port 2000:2999 rdr-to ... port 4000:*
- redirects port 2000 to 4000, port 2001 to 4001, ..., port 2999 to
4999.
rdr-to is usually applied inbound. If
applied outbound, rdr-to to a local IP address is not supported.
In addition to modifying the address, some translation rules may modify source
or destination ports for TCP or UDP connections; implicitly in the case of
nat-to options and explicitly in the case
of
rdr-to ones. Port numbers are never
translated with a
binat-to rule.
Translation options apply only to packets that pass through the specified
interface, and if no interface is specified, translation is applied to packets
on all interfaces. For instance, redirecting port 80 on an external interface
to an internal web server will only work for connections originating from the
outside. Connections to the address of the external interface from local hosts
will not be redirected, since such packets do not actually pass through the
external interface. Redirections cannot reflect packets back through the
interface they arrive on, they can only be redirected to hosts connected to
different interfaces or to the firewall itself.
However packets may be redirected to hosts connected to the interface the packet
arrived on by using redirection with NAT. For example:
pass in on $int_if proto tcp from $int_net to $ext_if port 80 \
rdr-to $server
pass out on $int_if proto tcp to $server port 80 \
received-on $int_if nat-to $int_if
Note that redirecting external incoming connections to the loopback address will
effectively allow an external host to connect to daemons bound solely to the
loopback address, circumventing the traditional blocking of such connections
on a real interface. For example:
pass in on egress proto tcp from any to any port smtp \
rdr-to 127.0.0.1 port spamd
Unless this effect is desired, any of the local non-loopback addresses should be
used instead as the redirection target, which allows external connections only
to daemons bound to this address or not bound to any address.
For
af-to,
nat-to and
rdr-to options for which there is a single
redirection address which has a subnet mask smaller than 32 for IPv4 or 128
for IPv6 (more than one IP address), a variety of different methods for
assigning this address can be used:
-
-
bitmask
- The
bitmask option applies the network
portion of the redirection address to the address to be modified (source
with nat-to, destination with
rdr-to).
-
-
least-states
[sticky-address
]
- The
least-states option selects the
address with the least active states from a given address pool and
considers given weights associated with address(es). Weights can be
specified between 1 and 65535. Addresses with higher weights are selected
more often.
sticky-address can be specified to ensure
that multiple connections from the same source are mapped to the same
redirection address. Associations are destroyed as soon as there are no
longer states which refer to them; in order to make the mappings last
beyond the lifetime of the states, increase the global options with
set timeout
src.track.
-
-
random
[sticky-address
]
- The
random option selects an address at
random within the defined block of addresses.
sticky-address is as described
above.
-
-
round-robin
[sticky-address
]
- The
round-robin option loops through
the redirection address(es) and considers given weights associated with
address(es). Weights can be specified between 1 and 65535. Addresses with
higher weights are selected more often.
sticky-address is as described
above.
-
-
source-hash
[key
]
- The
source-hash option uses a hash of
the source address to determine the redirection address, ensuring that the
redirection address is always the same for a given source. An optional
key can be specified after this keyword
either in hex or as a string; by default
pfctl(8) randomly generates a
key for source-hash every time the ruleset is reloaded.
-
-
static-port
- With
nat-to rules, the
static-port option prevents
pf(4) from modifying the source
port on TCP and UDP packets.
When more than one redirection address or a table is specified,
bitmask is not permitted as a pool type.
If a packet matches a rule with one of the following route options set, the
packet filter will route the packet according to the type of route option.
When such a rule creates state, the route option is also applied to all
packets matching the same connection.
-
-
dup-to
- The
dup-to option creates a duplicate
of the packet and routes it like
route-to. The original packet gets
routed as it normally would.
-
-
reply-to
- The
reply-to option is similar to
route-to, but routes packets that pass
in the opposite direction (replies) to the specified interface. Opposite
direction is only defined in the context of a state entry, and
reply-to is useful only in rules that
create state. It can be used on systems with multiple external connections
to route all outgoing packets of a connection through the interface the
incoming connection arrived through (symmetric routing enforcement).
-
-
route-to
- The
route-to option routes the packet
to the specified interface with an optional address for the next hop. When
a route-to rule creates state, only
packets that pass in the same direction as the filter rule specifies will
be routed in this way. Packets passing in the opposite direction (replies)
are not affected and are routed normally.
For the
dup-to,
reply-to, and
route-to route options for which there is a
single redirection address which has a subnet mask smaller than 32 for IPv4 or
128 for IPv6 (more than one IP address), the methods
least-states,
random,
round-robin, and
source-hash, as described above, can be
used.
pf(4) may be tuned for various
situations using the
set command.
-
-
set
block-policy drop |
return
- The
block-policy option sets the
default behaviour for the packet block
action:
drop
- Packet is silently dropped.
return
- A TCP RST is returned for blocked TCP packets, an ICMP UNREACHABLE is
returned for blocked UDP packets, and all other packets are silently
dropped.
-
-
set
debug
level
- Set the debug level, which limits the
severity of log messages printed by
pf(4). This should be a keyword
from the following ordered list (highest to lowest):
emerg,
alert,
crit,
err,
warning,
notice,
info, and
debug. These keywords correspond to the
similar (LOG_) values specified to the
syslog(3) library
routine.
-
-
set
fingerprints
filename
- Load fingerprints of known operating systems from the given
filename. By default fingerprints of
known operating systems are automatically loaded from
pf.os(5), but can be
overridden via this option. Setting this option may leave a small period
of time where the fingerprints referenced by the currently active ruleset
are inconsistent until the new ruleset finishes loading.
-
-
set
hostid
number
- The 32-bit hostid number identifies this
firewall's state table entries to other firewalls in a
pfsync(4) failover cluster.
By default the hostid is set to a pseudo-random value, however it may be
desirable to manually configure it, for example to more easily identify
the source of state table entries. The hostid may be specified in either
decimal or hexadecimal.
-
-
set
limit
limit-item number
- Sets hard limits on the memory pools used by the packet filter. See
pool(9) for an explanation of
memory pools.
For example, to set the maximum number of entries in the memory pool used by
state table entries (generated by
pass
rules which do not specify no state) to
20000:
set limit states
20000
To set the maximum number of entries in the memory pool used for fragment
reassembly to 2000:
set limit frags 2000
This maximum may not exceed, and should be well below, the maximum number of
mbuf clusters (sysctl kern.maxclusters) in the system.
To set the maximum number of entries in the memory pool used for tracking
source IP addresses (generated by the
sticky-address and
src.track options) to 2000:
set limit src-nodes
2000
To set limits on the memory pools used by tables:
set limit tables 1000
set limit table-entries 100000
The first limits the number of tables that can exist to 1000. The second
limits the overall number of addresses that can be stored in tables to
100000.
Various limits can be combined on a single line:
set limit { states 20000, frags 2000, src-nodes 2000 }
-
-
set
loginterface
interface |
none
- Enable collection of packet and byte count statistics for the given
interface or interface group. These statistics can be viewed using:
# pfctl -s info
In this example pf(4) collects
statistics on the interface named dc0:
set loginterface dc0
One can disable the loginterface using:
set loginterface
none
-
-
set
optimization
environment
- Optimize state timeouts for one of the following network environments:
aggressive
- Aggressively expire connections. This can greatly reduce the memory
usage of the firewall at the cost of dropping idle connections
early.
conservative
- Extremely conservative settings. Avoid dropping legitimate connections
at the expense of greater memory utilization (possibly much greater on
a busy network) and slightly increased processor utilization.
high-latency
- A high-latency environment (such as a satellite connection).
normal
- A normal network environment. Suitable for almost all networks.
satellite
- Alias for
high-latency.
-
-
set
reassemble yes |
no
[no-df
]
- The
reassemble option is used to enable
or disable the reassembly of fragmented packets, and can be set to
yes (the default) or
no. If
no-df is also specified, fragments with
the “dont-fragment” bit set are reassembled too, instead of
being dropped; the reassembled packet will have the
“dont-fragment” bit cleared.
-
-
set
ruleset-optimization
level
-
basic
- Enable basic ruleset optimization. This is the default behaviour.
Basic ruleset optimization does four things to improve the performance
of ruleset evaluations:
- remove duplicate rules
- remove rules that are a subset of another rule
- combine multiple rules into a table when advantageous
- reorder the rules to improve evaluation performance
none
- Disable the ruleset optimizer.
profile
- Uses the currently loaded ruleset as a feedback profile to tailor the
ordering of
quick rules to actual
network traffic.
It is important to note that the ruleset optimizer will modify the ruleset
to improve performance. A side effect of the ruleset modification is that
per-rule accounting statistics will have different meanings than before.
If per-rule accounting is important for billing purposes or whatnot,
either the ruleset optimizer should not be used or a label field should be
added to all of the accounting rules to act as optimization barriers.
Optimization can also be set as a command-line argument to
pfctl(8), overriding the
settings in pf.conf.
-
-
set
skip on
ifspec
- List interfaces for which packets should not be filtered. Packets passing
in or out on such interfaces are passed as if pf was disabled, i.e. pf
does not process them in any way. This can be useful on loopback and other
virtual interfaces, when packet filtering is not desired and can have
unexpected effects. ifspec is only
evaluated when the ruleset is loaded; interfaces created later will not be
skipped.
-
-
set
state-defaults
state-option,
...
- The
state-defaults option sets the
state options for states created from rules without an explicit
keep state. For example:
set state-defaults pflow,
no-sync
-
-
set
state-policy if-bound |
floating
- The
state-policy option sets the
default behaviour for states:
if-bound
- States are bound to an interface.
floating
- States can match packets on any interfaces (the default).
-
-
set
syncookies never |
always
|
adaptive
- When
syncookies are active, pf will
answer each and every incoming TCP SYN with a syncookie SYNACK, without
allocating any resources. Upon reception of the client's ACK in response
to the syncookie SYNACK, pf will evaluate the ruleset and create state if
the ruleset permits it, complete the three way handshake with the target
host, and continue the connection with synproxy in place. This allows pf
to be resilient against large synflood attacks, which could otherwise
exhaust the state table. Due to the blind answers to each and every SYN,
syncookies share the caveats of synproxy: seemingly accepting connections
that will be dropped later on.
never
- pf will never send syncookie SYNACKs (the default).
always
- pf will always send syncookie SYNACKs.
adaptive
- pf will enable syncookie mode when a given percentage of the state
table is used up by half-open TCP connections, such as those that saw
the initial SYN but didn't finish the three way handshake. The
thresholds for entering and leaving syncookie mode can be specified
using:
set syncookies adaptive (start 25%, end 12%)
-
-
set
timeout
variable value
-
frag
- Seconds before an unassembled fragment is expired.
interval
- Interval between purging expired states and fragments.
src.track
- Length of time to retain a source tracking entry after the last state
expires.
When a packet matches a stateful connection, the seconds to live for the
connection will be updated to that of the protocol and modifier which
corresponds to the connection state. Each packet which matches this state
will reset the TTL. Tuning these values may improve the performance of the
firewall at the risk of dropping valid idle connections.
tcp.closed
- The state after one endpoint sends an RST.
tcp.closing
- The state after the first FIN has been sent.
tcp.established
- The fully established state.
tcp.finwait
- The state after both FINs have been exchanged and the connection is
closed. Some hosts (notably web servers on Solaris) send TCP packets
even after closing the connection. Increasing
tcp.finwait (and possibly
tcp.closing) can prevent blocking
of such packets.
tcp.first
- The state after the first packet.
tcp.opening
- The state after the second packet but before both endpoints have
acknowledged the connection.
ICMP and UDP are handled in a fashion similar to TCP, but with a much more
limited set of states:
icmp.error
- The state after an ICMP error came back in response to an ICMP
packet.
icmp.first
- The state after the first packet.
udp.first
- The state after the first packet.
udp.multiple
- The state if both hosts have sent packets.
udp.single
- The state if the source host sends more than one packet but the
destination host has never sent one back.
Other protocols are handled similarly to UDP:
other.first
-
other.multiple
-
other.single
-
Timeout values can be reduced adaptively as the number of state table
entries grows.
adaptive.end
- When reaching this number of state entries, all timeout values become
zero, effectively purging all state entries immediately. This value is
used to define the scale factor; it should not actually be reached
(set a lower state limit, see below).
adaptive.start
- When the number of state entries exceeds this value, adaptive scaling
begins. All timeout values are scaled linearly with factor
(adaptive.end - number of states) / (adaptive.end -
adaptive.start).
Adaptive timeouts are enabled by default, with an adaptive.start value equal
to 60% of the state limit, and an adaptive.end value equal to 120% of the
state limit. They can be disabled by setting both adaptive.start and
adaptive.end to 0.
The adaptive timeout values can be defined both globally and for each rule.
When used on a per-rule basis, the values relate to the number of states
created by the rule, otherwise to the total number of states.
For example:
set timeout tcp.first 120
set timeout tcp.established 86400
set timeout { adaptive.start 60000, adaptive.end 120000 }
set limit states 100000
With 9000 state table entries, the timeout values are scaled to 50%
(tcp.first 60, tcp.established 43200).
Packets can be assigned to queues for the purpose of bandwidth control. At least
one declaration is required to configure queues, and later any packet
filtering rule can reference the defined queues by name. When filtering, the
last referenced
queue name is where any
passed packets will be queued, while for blocked packets it specifies where
any resulting ICMP or TCP RST packets should be queued. If the referenced
queue does not exist on the outgoing interface, the default queue for that
interface is used. Queues attached to an interface build a tree, thus each
queue can have further child queues. Only leaf queues, i.e. queues without
children, can be used to assign packets to. The root queue must specifically
reference an interface, all other queues pick up the interfaces they should be
created on from their parent queues.
In the following example, a queue named std is created on the interface em0,
with 3 child queues ssh, mail and http:
queue std on em0 bandwidth 100M
queue ssh parent std bandwidth 10M
queue mail parent std bandwidth 10M
queue http parent std bandwidth 80M default
The specified bandwidth is the target bandwidth, every queue can receive more
bandwidth as long as the parent still has some available. The maximum
bandwidth that should be assigned to a given queue can be limited using the
max keyword. If a limitation isn't imposed
on the root queue, borrowing can result in saturating the bandwidth of the
outgoing interface. Similarly, a minimum (reserved) bandwidth can be
specified:
queue ssh parent std bandwidth 10M
min 5M max 25M
For each of these 3 bandwidth specifications an additional burst bandwidth and
time can be specified:
queue ssh parent std bandwidth 10M
burst 90M for 100ms
All
bandwidth values are specified as bits
per second or using the suffixes
K,
M, and
G
to represent kilobits, megabits, and gigabits per second, respectively. The
value must not exceed the interface bandwidth.
If multiple connections are assigned the same queue, they're not guaranteed to
share the queue bandwidth fairly. An alternative flow queue manager can be
used to achieve fair sharing by indicating how many simultaneous states are
expected with a
flows option, unless a
minimum bandwidth has been specified as well.
When packets are classified by the stateful inspection engine, a flow identifier
is assigned to all packets belonging to the state, thus limiting the number of
individual flows that can be recognized by the resolution of a flow
identifier. The current implementation is able to classify traffic into 32767
distinct flows. However, efficient fair sharing is observed even with a much
smaller number of flows. For example on a 10Mbit/s DSL or a cable modem
uplink, the following simple configuration can be used:
queue outq on em0 bandwidth 9M max 9M flows 1024 qlimit 1024 \
default
It's important to specify the upper bound within 90-95% of the expected
bandwidth and raise the default queue limit.
If a
flows option appears without a
bandwidth specification, the flow queue
manager is selected as the queueing discipline for the corresponding interface
acting as a default queue for all outgoing packets. In such a scenario, a
queueing hierarchy is not supported.
In addition to the bandwidth and flow specifications, queues support the
following options:
-
-
default
- Packets not matched by another queue are assigned to this queue. Exactly
one default queue per interface is required.
-
-
on
interface
- Specifies the interface the queue operates on. If not given, it operates
on all matching interfaces.
-
-
parent
name
- Defines which parent queue the queue should be attached to. Mandatory for
all queues except root queues. The parent queue must exist.
-
-
quantum
size
- Specifies the quantum of service for the flow queue manager. The lower the
quantum size the more advantage is given to streams of smaller packets at
the expense of bulk transfers. The default value is set to the configured
Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of the specified interface.
-
-
qlimit
limit
- The maximum number of packets held in the queue. The default is 50.
Packets can be assigned to queues based on filter rules by using the
queue keyword. Normally only one
queue is specified; when a second one is
specified it will instead be used for packets which have a TOS of
lowdelay and for TCP ACKs with no data
payload.
To continue the previous example, the examples below would specify the four
referenced queues, plus a few child queues. Interactive
ssh(1) sessions get a queue with a
minimum bandwidth;
scp(1) and
sftp(1) bulk transfers go to a
separate queue. The queues are then referenced by filtering rules.
queue rootq on em0 bandwidth 100M max 100M
queue http parent rootq bandwidth 60M burst 90M for 100ms
queue developers parent http bandwidth 45M
queue employees parent http bandwidth 15M
queue mail parent rootq bandwidth 10M
queue ssh parent rootq bandwidth 20M
queue ssh_interactive parent ssh bandwidth 10M min 5M
queue ssh_bulk parent ssh bandwidth 10M
queue std parent rootq bandwidth 20M default
block return out on em0 inet all set queue std
pass out on em0 inet proto tcp from $developerhosts to any port 80 \
set queue developers
pass out on em0 inet proto tcp from $employeehosts to any port 80 \
set queue employees
pass out on em0 inet proto tcp from any to any port 22 \
set queue(ssh_bulk, ssh_interactive)
pass out on em0 inet proto tcp from any to any port 25 \
set queue mail
Tables are named structures which can hold a collection of addresses and
networks. Lookups against tables in
pf(4) are relatively fast, making a
single rule with tables much more efficient, in terms of processor usage and
memory consumption, than a large number of rules which differ only in IP
address (either created explicitly or automatically by rule expansion).
Tables can be used as the source or destination of filter or translation rules.
They can also be used for the redirect address of
nat-to and
rdr-to and in the routing options of filter
rules, but not for
bitmask pools.
Tables can be defined with any of the following
pfctl(8) mechanisms. As with
macros, reserved words may not be used as table names.
-
-
- manually
- Persistent tables can be manually created with the
add or
replace option of
pfctl(8), before or after the
ruleset has been loaded.
-
-
pf.conf
- Table definitions can be placed directly in this file and loaded at the
same time as other rules are loaded, atomically. Table definitions inside
pf.conf use the
table statement, and are especially
useful to define non-persistent tables. The contents of a pre-existing
table defined without a list of addresses to initialize it is not altered
when pf.conf is loaded. A table
initialized with the empty list, { }, will be
cleared on load.
Tables may be defined with the following attributes:
-
-
const
- The
const flag prevents the user from
altering the contents of the table once it has been created. Without that
flag, pfctl(8) can be used to
add or remove addresses from the table at any time, even when running with
securelevel(7) =
2.
-
-
counters
- The
counters flag enables per-address
packet and byte counters, which can be displayed with
pfctl(8).
-
-
persist
- The
persist flag forces the kernel to
keep the table even when no rules refer to it. If the flag is not set, the
kernel will automatically remove the table when the last rule referring to
it is flushed.
This example creates a table called “private”, to hold RFC 1918
private network blocks, and a table called “badhosts”, which is
initially empty. A filter rule is set up to block all traffic coming from
addresses listed in either table:
table <private> const { 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16 }
table <badhosts> persist
block on fxp0 from { <private>, <badhosts> } to any
The private table cannot have its contents changed and the badhosts table will
exist even when no active filter rules reference it. Addresses may later be
added to the badhosts table, so that traffic from these hosts can be blocked
by using the following:
# pfctl -t badhosts -Tadd
204.92.77.111
A table can also be initialized with an address list specified in one or more
external files, using the following syntax:
table <spam> persist file "/etc/spammers" file "/etc/openrelays"
block on fxp0 from <spam> to any
The files
/etc/spammers and
/etc/openrelays list IP addresses, one per
line. Any lines beginning with a ‘#’ are treated as comments and
ignored. In addition to being specified by IP address, hosts may also be
specified by their hostname. When the resolver is called to add a hostname to
a table,
all resulting IPv4 and IPv6 addresses
are placed into the table. IP addresses can also be entered in a table by
specifying a valid interface name, a valid interface group, or the
self keyword, in which case all addresses
assigned to the interface(s) will be added to the table.
Besides the main ruleset,
pf.conf can specify
anchor attachment points. An anchor is a container that can hold rules,
address tables, and other anchors. When evaluation of the main ruleset reaches
an
anchor rule,
pf(4) will proceed to evaluate all
rules specified in that anchor.
The following example blocks all packets on the external interface by default,
then evaluates all rules in the anchor named "spam", and finally
passes all outgoing connections and incoming connections to port 25:
ext_if = "kue0"
block on $ext_if all
anchor spam
pass out on $ext_if all
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to $ext_if port smtp
Anchors can be manipulated through
pfctl(8) without reloading the
main ruleset or other anchors. This loads a single rule into the anchor, which
blocks all packets from a specific address:
# echo "block in quick from 1.2.3.4 to any" | pfctl -a spam -f -
The anchor can also be populated by adding a
load
anchor rule after the anchor rule. When
pfctl(8) loads
pf.conf, it will also load all the rules
from the file
/etc/pf-spam.conf into the
anchor.
anchor spam
load anchor spam from "/etc/pf-spam.conf"
An anchor rule can also contain a filter ruleset in a brace-delimited block. In
that case, no separate loading of rules into the anchor is required. Brace
delimited blocks may contain rules or other brace-delimited blocks. When an
anchor is populated this way the anchor name becomes optional. Since the
parser specification for anchor names is a string, double quote characters
(‘"’) should be placed around the anchor name.
anchor "external" on egress {
block
anchor out {
pass proto tcp from any to port { 25, 80, 443 }
}
pass in proto tcp to any port 22
}
Anchor rules can also specify packet filtering parameters using the same syntax
as filter rules. When parameters are used, the anchor rule is only evaluated
for matching packets. This allows conditional evaluation of anchors, like:
block on $ext_if all
anchor spam proto tcp from any to any port smtp
pass out on $ext_if all
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to $ext_if port smtp
The rules inside anchor "spam" are only evaluated for TCP packets with
destination port 25. Hence, the following will only block connections from
1.2.3.4 to port 25:
# echo "block in quick from 1.2.3.4 to any" | pfctl -a spam -f -
Matching filter and translation rules marked with the
quick option are final and abort the
evaluation of the rules in other anchors and the main ruleset. If the anchor
itself is marked with the
quick option,
ruleset evaluation will terminate when the anchor is exited if the packet is
matched by any rule within the anchor.
An anchor references other anchor attachment points using the following syntax:
-
-
anchor
name
- Evaluates the filter rules in the specified anchor.
An anchor has a name which specifies the path where
pfctl(8) can be used to access
the anchor to perform operations on it, such as attaching child anchors to it
or loading rules into it. Anchors may be nested, with components separated by
‘/’ characters, similar to how file system hierarchies are laid
out. The main ruleset is actually the default anchor, so filter and
translation rules, for example, may also be contained in any anchor.
Anchor rules are evaluated relative to the anchor in which they are contained.
For example, all anchor rules specified in the main ruleset will reference
anchor attachment points underneath the main ruleset, and anchor rules
specified in a file loaded from a
load
anchor rule will be attached under that anchor point.
Anchors may end with the asterisk (‘*’) character, which signifies
that all anchors attached at that point should be evaluated in the
alphabetical ordering of their anchor name. For example, the following will
evaluate each rule in each anchor attached to the "spam" anchor:
Note that it will only evaluate anchors that are directly attached to the
"spam" anchor, and will not descend to evaluate anchors recursively.
Since anchors are evaluated relative to the anchor in which they are contained,
there is a mechanism for accessing the parent and ancestor anchors of a given
anchor. Similar to file system path name resolution, if the sequence
‘..’ appears as an anchor path component, the parent anchor of
the current anchor in the path evaluation at that point will become the new
current anchor. As an example, consider the following:
# printf 'anchor "spam/allowed"\n' | pfctl -f -
# printf 'anchor "../banned"\npass\n' | pfctl -a spam/allowed -f -
Evaluation of the main ruleset will lead into the spam/allowed anchor, which
will evaluate the rules in the spam/banned anchor, if any, before finally
evaluating the
pass rule.
pf(4) filters packets statefully,
which has several advantages. For TCP connections, comparing a packet to a
state involves checking its sequence numbers, as well as TCP timestamps if a
rule using the
reassemble tcp parameter
applies to the connection. If these values are outside the narrow windows of
expected values, the packet is dropped. This prevents spoofing attacks, such
as when an attacker sends packets with a fake source address/port but does not
know the connection's sequence numbers. Similarly,
pf(4) knows how to match ICMP
replies to states. For example, to allow echo requests (such as those created
by
ping(8)) out statefully and
match incoming echo replies correctly to states:
pass out inet proto icmp all
icmp-type echoreq
Also, looking up states is usually faster than evaluating rules. If there are 50
rules, all of them are evaluated sequentially in O(n). Even with 50000 states,
only 16 comparisons are needed to match a state, since states are stored in a
binary search tree that allows searches in O(log2 n).
Furthermore, correct handling of ICMP error messages is critical to many
protocols, particularly TCP.
pf(4)
matches ICMP error messages to the correct connection, checks them against
connection parameters, and passes them if appropriate. For example if an ICMP
source quench message referring to a stateful TCP connection arrives, it will
be matched to the state and get passed.
Finally, state tracking is required for
nat-to and
rdr-to options, in order to track address
and port translations and reverse the translation on returning packets.
pf(4) will also create state for other
protocols which are effectively stateless by nature. UDP packets are matched
to states using only host addresses and ports, and other protocols are matched
to states using only the host addresses.
If stateless filtering of individual packets is desired, the
no state keyword can be used to specify
that state will not be created if this is the last matching rule. Note that
packets which match neither block nor pass rules, and thus are passed by
default, are effectively passed as if
no
state had been specified.
A number of parameters can also be set to affect how
pf(4) handles state tracking, as
detailed below.
Much of the security derived from TCP is attributable to how well the initial
sequence numbers (ISNs) are chosen. Some popular stack implementations choose
very poor ISNs and thus are normally susceptible
to ISN prediction exploits. By applying a
modulate
state rule to a TCP connection,
pf(4) will create a high quality
random sequence number for each connection endpoint.
The
modulate state directive implicitly keeps
state on the rule and is only applicable to TCP connections.
For instance:
block all
pass out proto tcp from any to any modulate state
pass in proto tcp from any to any port 25 flags S/SFRA \
modulate state
Note that modulated connections will not recover when the state table is lost
(firewall reboot, flushing the state table, etc.).
pf(4) will not be able to infer a
connection again after the state table flushes the connection's modulator.
When the state is lost, the connection may be left dangling until the
respective endpoints time out the connection. It is possible on a fast local
network for the endpoints to start an ACK storm while trying to resynchronize
after the loss of the modulator. The default
flags settings (or a more strict
equivalent) should be used on
modulate
state rules to prevent ACK storms.
Note that alternative methods are available to prevent loss of the state table
and allow for firewall failover. See
carp(4) and
pfsync(4) for further
information.
By default,
pf(4) passes packets that
are part of a TCP handshake between the endpoints. The
synproxy state option can be used to cause
pf(4) itself to complete the
handshake with the active endpoint, perform a handshake with the passive
endpoint, and then forward packets between the endpoints.
No packets are sent to the passive endpoint before the active endpoint has
completed the handshake, hence so-called SYN floods with spoofed source
addresses will not reach the passive endpoint, as the sender can't complete
the handshake.
The proxy is transparent to both endpoints; they each see a single connection
from/to the other endpoint.
pf(4)
chooses random initial sequence numbers for both handshakes. Once the
handshakes are completed, the sequence number modulators (see previous
section) are used to translate further packets of the connection.
synproxy state includes
modulate state.
Rules with
synproxy state will not work if
pf(4) operates on a
bridge(4).
Example:
pass in proto tcp from any to any port www synproxy state
A number of options related to stateful tracking can be applied on a per-rule
basis. One of
keep state,
modulate state, or
synproxy state must be specified explicitly
to apply these options to a rule.
floating
- States can match packets on any interfaces (the opposite of
if-bound). This is the default.
if-bound
- States are bound to an interface (the opposite of
floating).
max
number
- Limits the number of concurrent states the rule may create. When this
limit is reached, further packets that would create state are dropped
until existing states time out.
no-sync
- Prevent state changes for states created by this rule from appearing on
the pfsync(4)
interface.
pflow
- States created by this rule are exported on the
pflow(4) interface.
sloppy
- Uses a sloppy TCP connection tracker that does not check sequence numbers
at all, which makes insertion and ICMP teardown attacks way easier. This
is intended to be used in situations where one does not see all packets of
a connection, e.g. in asymmetric routing situations. It cannot be used
with
modulate state or
synproxy state.
- timeout seconds
- Changes the timeout values used for
states created by this rule. For a list of all valid
timeout names, see
OPTIONS above.
Multiple options can be specified, separated by commas:
pass in proto tcp from any to any \
port www keep state \
(max 100, source-track rule, max-src-nodes 75, \
max-src-states 3, tcp.established 60, tcp.closing 5)
When the
source-track keyword is specified,
the number of states per source IP is tracked.
source-track
global
- The number of states created by all rules that use this option is limited.
Each rule can specify different
max-src-nodes and
max-src-states options, however state
entries created by any participating rule count towards each individual
rule's limits.
source-track
rule
- The maximum number of states created by this rule is limited by the rule's
max-src-nodes and
max-src-states options. Only state
entries created by this particular rule count toward the rule's
limits.
The following limits can be set:
max-src-nodes
number
- Limits the maximum number of source addresses which can simultaneously
have state table entries.
max-src-states
number
- Limits the maximum number of simultaneous state entries that a single
source address can create with this rule.
For stateful TCP connections, limits on established connections (connections
which have completed the TCP 3-way handshake) can also be enforced per source
IP.
max-src-conn
number
- Limits the maximum number of simultaneous TCP connections which have
completed the 3-way handshake that a single host can make.
max-src-conn-rate
number/seconds
- Limit the rate of new connections over a time interval. The connection
rate is an approximation calculated as a moving average.
When one of these limits is reached, further packets that would create state are
dropped until existing states time out.
Because the 3-way handshake ensures that the source address is not being
spoofed, more aggressive action can be taken based on these limits. With the
overload
<
table> state option, source IP
addresses which hit either of the limits on established connections will be
added to the named
table. This table can be
used in the ruleset to block further activity from the offending host,
redirect it to a tarpit process, or restrict its bandwidth.
The optional
flush keyword kills all states
created by the matching rule which originate from the host which exceeds these
limits. The
global modifier to the
flush command kills all states originating
from the offending host, regardless of which rule created the state.
For example, the following rules will protect the webserver against hosts making
more than 100 connections in 10 seconds. Any host which connects faster than
this rate will have its address added to the <bad_hosts> table and have
all states originating from it flushed. Any new packets arriving from this
host will be dropped unconditionally by the block rule.
block quick from <bad_hosts>
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp to $webserver port www keep state \
(max-src-conn-rate 100/10, overload <bad_hosts> flush global)
Traffic normalisation is a broad umbrella term for aspects of the packet filter
which deal with verifying packets, packet fragments, spoof traffic, and other
irregularities.
Scrub involves sanitising packet content in such a way that there are no
ambiguities in packet interpretation on the receiving side. It is invoked with
the
scrub option, added to regular rules.
Parameters are specified enclosed in parentheses. At least one of the following
parameters must be specified:
-
-
max-mss
number
- Enforces a maximum segment size (MSS) for matching TCP packets.
-
-
min-ttl
number
- Enforces a minimum TTL for matching IP packets.
-
-
no-df
- Clears the “dont-fragment” bit from a matching IPv4 packet.
Some operating systems have NFS implementations which are known to
generate fragmented packets with the “dont-fragment” bit
set. pf(4) will drop such
fragmented “dont-fragment” packets unless
no-df is specified.
Unfortunately some operating systems also generate their
“dont-fragment” packets with a zero IP identification field.
Clearing the “dont-fragment” bit on packets with a zero IP
ID may cause deleterious results if an upstream router later fragments the
packet. Using random-id is recommended
in combination with no-df to ensure
unique IP identifiers.
-
-
random-id
- Replaces the IPv4 identification field with random values to compensate
for predictable values generated by many hosts. This option only applies
to packets that are not fragmented after the optional fragment
reassembly.
-
-
reassemble
tcp
- Statefully normalises TCP connections.
reassemble tcp performs the following
normalisations:
- TTL
- Neither side of the connection is allowed to reduce their IP TTL. An
attacker may send a packet such that it reaches the firewall, affects
the firewall state, and expires before reaching the destination host.
reassemble tcp will raise the TTL
of all packets back up to the highest value seen on the
connection.
- Timestamp Modulation
- Modern TCP stacks will send a timestamp on every TCP packet and echo
the other endpoint's timestamp back to them. Many operating systems
will merely start the timestamp at zero when first booted, and
increment it several times a second. The uptime of the host can be
deduced by reading the timestamp and multiplying by a constant. Also
observing several different timestamps can be used to count hosts
behind a NAT device. And spoofing TCP packets into a connection
requires knowing or guessing valid timestamps. Timestamps merely need
to be monotonically increasing and not derived off a guessable base
time.
reassemble tcp will cause
scrub to modulate the TCP
timestamps with a random number.
- Extended PAWS Checks
- There is a problem with TCP on long fat pipes, in that a packet might
get delayed for longer than it takes the connection to wrap its 32-bit
sequence space. In such an occurrence, the old packet would be
indistinguishable from a new packet and would be accepted as such. The
solution to this is called PAWS: Protection Against Wrapped Sequence
numbers. It protects against it by making sure the timestamp on each
packet does not go backwards.
reassemble
tcp also makes sure the timestamp on the packet does not go
forward more than the RFC allows. By doing this,
pf(4) artificially extends
the security of TCP sequence numbers by 10 to 18 bits when the host
uses appropriately randomized timestamps, since a blind attacker would
have to guess the timestamp as well.
For example:
match in all scrub (no-df random-id
max-mss 1440)
The size of IP datagrams (packets) can be significantly larger than the maximum
transmission unit (MTU) of the network. In cases when it is necessary or more
efficient to send such large packets, the large packet will be fragmented into
many smaller packets that will each fit onto the wire. Unfortunately for a
firewalling device, only the first logical fragment will contain the necessary
header information for the subprotocol that allows
pf(4) to filter on things such as
TCP ports or to perform NAT.
One alternative is to filter individual fragments with filter rules. If packet
reassembly is turned off, it is passed to the filter. Filter rules with
matching IP header parameters decide whether the fragment is passed or
blocked, in the same way as complete packets are filtered. Without reassembly,
fragments can only be filtered based on IP header fields (source/destination
address, protocol), since subprotocol header fields are not available (TCP/UDP
port numbers, ICMP code/type). The
fragment
option can be used to restrict filter rules to apply only to fragments, but
not complete packets. Filter rules without the
fragment option still apply to fragments,
if they only specify IP header fields. For instance:
pass in proto tcp from any to any port 80
The rule above never applies to a fragment, even if the fragment is part of a
TCP packet with destination port 80, because without reassembly this
information is not available for each fragment. This also means that fragments
cannot create new or match existing state table entries, which makes stateful
filtering and address translation (NAT, redirection) for fragments impossible.
In most cases, the benefits of reassembly outweigh the additional memory cost,
so reassembly is on by default.
The memory allocated for fragment caching can be limited using
pfctl(8). Once this limit is
reached, fragments that would have to be cached are dropped until other
entries time out. The timeout value can also be adjusted.
When forwarding reassembled IPv6 packets, pf refragments them with the original
maximum fragment size. This allows the sender to determine the optimal
fragment size by path MTU discovery.
Spoofing is the faking of IP addresses, typically for malicious purposes. The
antispoof directive expands to a set of
filter rules which will block all traffic with a source IP from the network(s)
directly connected to the specified interface(s) from entering the system
through any other interface.
For example:
antispoof for lo0
Expands to:
block drop in on ! lo0 inet from 127.0.0.1/8 to any
block drop in on ! lo0 inet6 from ::1 to any
For non-loopback interfaces, there are additional rules to block incoming
packets with a source IP address identical to the interface's IP(s). For
example, assuming the interface wi0 had an IP address of 10.0.0.1 and a
netmask of 255.255.255.0:
antispoof for wi0 inet
Expands to:
block drop in on ! wi0 inet from 10.0.0.0/24 to any
block drop in inet from 10.0.0.1 to any
Caveat: Rules created by the
antispoof
directive interfere with packets sent over loopback interfaces to local
addresses. One should pass these explicitly.
Passive OS fingerprinting is a mechanism to inspect nuances of a TCP
connection's initial SYN packet and guess at the host's operating system.
Unfortunately these nuances are easily spoofed by an attacker so the
fingerprint is not useful in making security decisions. But the fingerprint is
typically accurate enough to make policy decisions upon.
The fingerprints may be specified by operating system class, by version, or by
subtype/patchlevel. The class of an operating system is typically the vendor
or genre and would be
OpenBSD for the
pf(4) firewall itself. The version
of the oldest available
OpenBSD release on the main
FTP site would be 2.6 and the fingerprint would be written as:
"OpenBSD 2.6"
The subtype of an operating system is typically used to describe the patchlevel
if that patch led to changes in the TCP stack behavior. In the case of
OpenBSD, the only subtype is for a fingerprint that
was normalised by the
no-df scrub option
and would be specified as:
"OpenBSD 3.3
no-df"
Fingerprints for most popular operating systems are provided by
pf.os(5). Once
pf(4) is running, a complete list of
known operating system fingerprints may be listed by running:
# pfctl -so
Filter rules can enforce policy at any level of operating system specification
assuming a fingerprint is present. Policy could limit traffic to approved
operating systems or even ban traffic from hosts that aren't at the latest
service pack.
The
unknown class can also be used as the
fingerprint which will match packets for which no operating system fingerprint
is known.
Examples:
pass out proto tcp from any os OpenBSD
block out proto tcp from any os Doors
block out proto tcp from any os "Doors PT"
block out proto tcp from any os "Doors PT SP3"
block out from any os "unknown"
pass on lo0 proto tcp from any os "OpenBSD 3.3 lo0"
Operating system fingerprinting is limited only to the TCP SYN packet. This
means that it will not work on other protocols and will not match a currently
established connection.
Caveat: operating system fingerprints are occasionally wrong. There are three
problems: an attacker can trivially craft his packets to appear as any
operating system he chooses; an operating system patch could change the stack
behavior and no fingerprints will match it until the database is updated; and
multiple operating systems may have the same fingerprint.
In this example, the external interface is
kue0. We use a macro for the interface
name, so it can be changed easily. All incoming traffic is
"normalised", and everything is blocked and logged by default.
ext_if = "kue0"
match in all scrub (no-df max-mss 1440)
block return log on $ext_if all
Here we specifically block packets we don't want: anything coming from source we
have no back routes for; packets whose ingress interface does not match the
one in the route back to their source address; anything that does not have our
address (157.161.48.183) as source; broadcasts (cable modem noise); and
anything from reserved address space or invalid addresses.
block in from no-route to any
block in from urpf-failed to any
block out log quick on $ext_if from ! 157.161.48.183 to any
block in quick on $ext_if from any to 255.255.255.255
block in log quick on $ext_if from { 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, \
192.168.0.0/16, 255.255.255.255/32 } to any
For ICMP, pass out/in ping queries. State matching is done on host addresses and
ICMP ID (not type/code), so replies (like 0/0 for 8/0) will match queries.
ICMP error messages (which always refer to a TCP/UDP packet) are handled by
the TCP/UDP states.
pass on $ext_if inet proto icmp all icmp-type 8 code 0
For UDP, pass out all UDP connections. DNS connections are passed in.
pass out on $ext_if proto udp all
pass in on $ext_if proto udp from any to any port domain
For TCP, pass out all TCP connections and modulate state. SSH, SMTP, DNS, and
IDENT connections are passed in. We do not allow Windows 9x SMTP connections
since they are typically a viral worm.
pass out on $ext_if proto tcp all modulate state
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any \
port { ssh, smtp, domain, auth }
block in on $ext_if proto tcp from any \
os { "Windows 95", "Windows 98" } to any port smtp
Here we pass in/out all IPv6 traffic: note that we have to enable this in two
different ways, on both our physical interface and our tunnel.
pass quick on gif0 inet6
pass quick on $ext_if proto ipv6
This example illustrates packet tagging. There are three interfaces: $int_if,
$ext_if, and $wifi_if (wireless). NAT is being done on $ext_if for all
outgoing packets. Packets in on $int_if are tagged and passed out on $ext_if.
All other outgoing packets (i.e. packets from the wireless network) are only
permitted to access port 80.
pass in on $int_if from any to any tag INTNET
pass in on $wifi_if from any to any
block out on $ext_if from any to any
pass out quick on $ext_if tagged INTNET
pass out on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 80
In this example, we tag incoming packets as they are redirected to spamd(8). The
tag is used to pass those packets through the packet filter.
match in on $ext_if inet proto tcp from <spammers> to port smtp \
tag SPAMD rdr-to 127.0.0.1 port spamd
block in on $ext_if
pass in on $ext_if inet proto tcp tagged SPAMD
This example maps incoming requests on port 80 to port 8080, on which a daemon
is running (because, for example, it is not run as root, and therefore lacks
permission to bind to port 80).
match in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 80 \
rdr-to 127.0.0.1 port 8080
If a
pass rule is used with the
quick modifier, packets matching the
translation rule are passed without inspecting subsequent filter rules.
pass in quick on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 80 \
rdr-to 127.0.0.1 port 8080
In the example below, vlan12 is configured as 192.168.168.1; the machine
translates all packets coming from 192.168.168.0/24 to 204.92.77.111 when they
are going out any interface except vlan12. This has the net effect of making
traffic from the 192.168.168.0/24 network appear as though it is the Internet
routable address 204.92.77.111 to nodes behind any interface on the router
except for the nodes on vlan12. Thus, 192.168.168.1 can talk to the
192.168.168.0/24 nodes.
match out on ! vlan12 from 192.168.168.0/24 to any nat-to 204.92.77.111
In the example below, the machine sits between a fake internal 144.19.74.*
network, and a routable external IP of 204.92.77.100. The last rule excludes
protocol AH from being translated.
pass out on $ext_if from 144.19.74.0/24 nat-to 204.92.77.100
pass out on $ext_if proto ah from 144.19.74.0/24
In the example below, packets bound for one specific server, as well as those
generated by the sysadmins are not proxied; all other connections are.
pass in on $int_if proto { tcp, udp } from any to any port 80 \
rdr-to 127.0.0.1 port 80
pass in on $int_if proto { tcp, udp } from any to $server port 80
pass in on $int_if proto { tcp, udp } from $sysadmins to any port 80
This example maps outgoing packets' source port to an assigned proxy port
instead of an arbitrary port. In this case, proxy outgoing isakmp with port
500 on the gateway.
match out on $ext_if inet proto udp from any port isakmp to any \
nat-to ($ext_if) port 500
One more example uses
rdr-to to redirect a
TCP and UDP port to an internal machine.
match in on $ext_if inet proto tcp from any to ($ext_if) port 8080 \
rdr-to 10.1.2.151 port 22
match in on $ext_if inet proto udp from any to ($ext_if) port 8080 \
rdr-to 10.1.2.151 port 53
In this example, a NAT gateway is set up to translate internal addresses using a
pool of public addresses (192.0.2.16/28). A given source address is always
translated to the same pool address by using the
source-hash keyword. The gateway also
translates incoming web server connections to a group of web servers on the
internal network.
match out on $ext_if inet from any to any nat-to 192.0.2.16/28 \
source-hash
match in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 80 \
rdr-to { 10.1.2.155 weight 2, 10.1.2.160 weight 1, \
10.1.2.161 weight 8 } round-robin
The bidirectional address translation example uses a single
binat-to rule that expands to a
nat-to and an
rdr-to rule.
pass on $ext_if from 10.1.2.120 to any binat-to 192.0.2.17
The previous example is identical to the following set of rules:
pass out on $ext_if inet from 10.1.2.120 to any \
nat-to 192.0.2.17 static-port
pass in on $ext_if inet from any to 192.0.2.17 rdr-to 10.1.2.120
In the example below, a router handling both address families translates an
internal IPv4 subnet to IPv6 using the well-known 64:ff9b::/96 prefix:
pass in on $v4_if inet af-to inet6 from ($v6_if) to 64:ff9b::/96
Paired with the example above, the example below can be used on another router
handling both address families to translate back to IPv4:
pass in on $v6_if inet6 to 64:ff9b::/96 af-to inet from ($v4_if)
Syntax for
pf.conf in BNF:
line = ( option | pf-rule |
antispoof-rule | queue-rule | anchor-rule |
anchor-close | load-anchor | table-rule | include )
option = "set" ( [ "timeout" ( timeout | "{" timeout-list "}" ) ] |
[ "ruleset-optimization" [ "none" | "basic" |
"profile" ] ] |
[ "optimization" [ "default" | "normal" | "high-latency" |
"satellite" | "aggressive" | "conservative" ] ]
[ "limit" ( limit-item | "{" limit-list "}" ) ] |
[ "loginterface" ( interface-name | "none" ) ] |
[ "block-policy" ( "drop" | "return" ) ] |
[ "state-policy" ( "if-bound" | "floating" ) ]
[ "state-defaults" state-opts ]
[ "fingerprints" filename ] |
[ "skip on" ifspec ] |
[ "debug" ( "emerg" | "alert" | "crit" | "err" |
"warning" | "notice" | "info" | "debug" ) ] |
[ "reassemble" ( "yes" | "no" ) [ "no-df" ] ] )
pf-rule = action [ ( "in" | "out" ) ]
[ "log" [ "(" logopts ")"] ] [ "quick" ]
[ "on" ( ifspec | "rdomain" number ) ] [ af ]
[ protospec ] [ hosts ] [ filteropts ]
logopts = logopt [ [ "," ] logopts ]
logopt = "all" | "matches" | "user" | "to" interface-name
filteropts = filteropt [ [ "," ] filteropts ]
filteropt = user | group | flags | icmp-type | icmp6-type |
"tos" tos |
( "no" | "keep" | "modulate" | "synproxy" ) "state"
[ "(" state-opts ")" ] | "scrub" "(" scrubopts ")" |
"fragment" | "allow-opts" | "once" |
"divert-packet" "port" port | "divert-reply" |
"divert-to" host "port" port |
"label" string | "tag" string | [ "!" ] "tagged" string |
"max-pkt-rate" number "/" seconds |
"set delay" number |
"set prio" ( number | "(" number [ [ "," ] number ] ")" ) |
"set queue" ( string | "(" string [ [ "," ] string ] ")" ) |
"rtable" number | "probability" number"%" | "prio" number |
"af-to" af "from" ( redirhost | "{" redirhost-list "}" )
[ "to" ( redirhost | "{" redirhost-list "}" ) ] |
"binat-to" ( redirhost | "{" redirhost-list "}" )
[ portspec ] [ pooltype ] |
"rdr-to" ( redirhost | "{" redirhost-list "}" )
[ portspec ] [ pooltype ] |
"nat-to" ( redirhost | "{" redirhost-list "}" )
[ portspec ] [ pooltype ] [ "static-port" ] |
[ route ] | [ "set tos" tos ] |
[ [ "!" ] "received-on" ( interface-name | interface-group ) ]
scrubopts = scrubopt [ [ "," ] scrubopts ]
scrubopt = "no-df" | "min-ttl" number | "max-mss" number |
"reassemble tcp" | "random-id"
antispoof-rule = "antispoof" [ "log" ] [ "quick" ]
"for" ifspec [ af ] [ "label" string ]
table-rule = "table" "<" string ">" [ tableopts ]
tableopts = tableopt [ tableopts ]
tableopt = "persist" | "const" | "counters" |
"file" string | "{" [ tableaddrs ] "}"
tableaddrs = tableaddr-spec [ [ "," ] tableaddrs ]
tableaddr-spec = [ "!" ] tableaddr [ "/" mask-bits ]
tableaddr = hostname | ifspec | "self" |
ipv4-dotted-quad | ipv6-coloned-hex
queue-rule = "queue" string [ "on" interface-name ] queueopts-list
anchor-rule = "anchor" [ string ] [ ( "in" | "out" ) ] [ "on" ifspec ]
[ af ] [ protospec ] [ hosts ] [ filteropt-list ] [ "{" ]
anchor-close = "}"
load-anchor = "load anchor" string "from" filename
queueopts-list = queueopts-list queueopts | queueopts
queueopts = ([ "bandwidth" bandwidth ] | [ "min" bandwidth ] |
[ "max" bandwidth ] | [ "parent" string ] |
[ "default" ]) |
([ "flows" number ] | [ "quantum" number ]) |
[ "qlimit" number ]
bandwidth = bandwidth-spec [ "burst" bandwidth-spec "for" number "ms" ]
bandwidth-spec = number ( "" | "K" | "M" | "G" )
action = "pass" | "match" | "block" [ return ]
return = "drop" | "return" |
"return-rst" [ "(" "ttl" number ")" ] |
"return-icmp" [ "(" icmpcode [ [ "," ] icmp6code ] ")" ] |
"return-icmp6" [ "(" icmp6code ")" ]
icmpcode = ( icmp-code-name | icmp-code-number )
icmp6code = ( icmp6-code-name | icmp6-code-number )
ifspec = ( [ "!" ] ( interface-name | interface-group ) ) |
"{" interface-list "}"
interface-list = [ "!" ] ( interface-name | interface-group )
[ [ "," ] interface-list ]
route = ( "route-to" | "reply-to" | "dup-to" )
( routehost | "{" routehost-list "}" )
[ pooltype ]
af = "inet" | "inet6"
protospec = "proto" ( proto-name | proto-number |
"{" proto-list "}" )
proto-list = ( proto-name | proto-number ) [ [ "," ] proto-list ]
hosts = "all" |
"from" ( "any" | "no-route" | "urpf-failed" | "self" |
host | "{" host-list "}" | "route" string ) [ port ]
[ os ]
"to" ( "any" | "no-route" | "self" | host |
"{" host-list "}" | "route" string ) [ port ]
ipspec = "any" | host | "{" host-list "}"
host = [ "!" ] ( address [ "weight" number ] |
address [ "/" mask-bits ] [ "weight" number ] |
"<" string ">" )
redirhost = address [ "/" mask-bits ]
routehost = host | host "@" interface-name |
"(" interface-name [ address [ "/" mask-bits ] ] ")"
address = ( interface-name | interface-group |
"(" ( interface-name | interface-group ) ")" |
hostname | ipv4-dotted-quad | ipv6-coloned-hex )
host-list = host [ [ "," ] host-list ]
redirhost-list = redirhost [ [ "," ] redirhost-list ]
routehost-list = routehost [ [ "," ] routehost-list ]
port = "port" ( unary-op | binary-op | "{" op-list "}" )
portspec = "port" ( number | name ) [ ":" ( "*" | number | name ) ]
os = "os" ( os-name | "{" os-list "}" )
user = "user" ( unary-op | binary-op | "{" op-list "}" )
group = "group" ( unary-op | binary-op | "{" op-list "}" )
unary-op = [ "=" | "!=" | "<" | "<=" | ">" | ">=" ]
( name | number )
binary-op = number ( "<>" | "><" | ":" ) number
op-list = ( unary-op | binary-op ) [ [ "," ] op-list ]
os-name = operating-system-name
os-list = os-name [ [ "," ] os-list ]
flags = "flags" ( [ flag-set ] "/" flag-set | "any" )
flag-set = [ "F" ] [ "S" ] [ "R" ] [ "P" ] [ "A" ] [ "U" ] [ "E" ]
[ "W" ]
icmp-type = "icmp-type" ( icmp-type-code | "{" icmp-list "}" )
icmp6-type = "icmp6-type" ( icmp-type-code | "{" icmp-list "}" )
icmp-type-code = ( icmp-type-name | icmp-type-number )
[ "code" ( icmp-code-name | icmp-code-number ) ]
icmp-list = icmp-type-code [ [ "," ] icmp-list ]
tos = ( "lowdelay" | "throughput" | "reliability" |
[ "0x" ] number )
state-opts = state-opt [ [ "," ] state-opts ]
state-opt = ( "max" number | "no-sync" | timeout | "sloppy" |
"pflow" | "source-track" [ ( "rule" | "global" ) ] |
"max-src-nodes" number | "max-src-states" number |
"max-src-conn" number |
"max-src-conn-rate" number "/" number |
"overload" "<" string ">" [ "flush" [ "global" ] ] |
"if-bound" | "floating" )
timeout-list = timeout [ [ "," ] timeout-list ]
timeout = ( "tcp.first" | "tcp.opening" | "tcp.established" |
"tcp.closing" | "tcp.finwait" | "tcp.closed" |
"udp.first" | "udp.single" | "udp.multiple" |
"icmp.first" | "icmp.error" |
"other.first" | "other.single" | "other.multiple" |
"frag" | "interval" | "src.track" |
"adaptive.start" | "adaptive.end" ) number
limit-list = limit-item [ [ "," ] limit-list ]
limit-item = ( "states" | "frags" | "src-nodes" | "tables" |
"table-entries" ) number
pooltype = ( "bitmask" | "least-states" |
"random" | "round-robin" |
"source-hash" [ ( hex-key | string-key ) ] )
[ "sticky-address" ]
include = "include" filename
- /etc/hosts
- Host name database.
- /etc/pf.conf
- Default location of the ruleset file.
- /etc/pf.os
- Default location of OS fingerprints.
- /etc/protocols
- Protocol name database.
- /etc/services
- Service name database.
pf(4),
pflow(4),
pfsync(4),
pf.os(5),
pfctl(8),
pflogd(8)
The
pf.conf file format first appeared in
OpenBSD 3.0.