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MALLOC(3) Library Functions Manual MALLOC(3)

malloc, calloc, realloc, free, reallocarray, recallocarray, freezero —
memory allocation and deallocation

#include <stdlib.h>
void *
malloc(size_t size);
void *
calloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size);
void *
realloc(void *ptr, size_t size);
void
free(void *ptr);
void *
reallocarray(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size);
void *
recallocarray(void *ptr, size_t oldnmemb, size_t nmemb, size_t size);
void
freezero(void *ptr, size_t size);
char *malloc_options;

The standard functions malloc(), calloc(), and realloc() allocate objects, regions of memory to store values. The malloc() function allocates uninitialized space for an object of the specified size. malloc() maintains multiple lists of free objects according to size, allocating from the appropriate list or requesting memory from the kernel. The allocated space is suitably aligned (after possible pointer coercion) for storage of any type of object.
The calloc() function allocates space for an array of nmemb objects, each of the specified size. The space is initialized to zero.
The realloc() function changes the size of the object pointed to by ptr to size bytes and returns a pointer to the (possibly moved) object. If ptr is not NULL, it must be a pointer returned by an earlier call to an allocation or reallocation function that was not freed in between. The contents of the object are unchanged up to the lesser of the new and old sizes. If the new size is larger, the value of the newly allocated portion of the object is indeterminate and uninitialized. If the space cannot be allocated, the object pointed to by ptr is unchanged. If ptr is NULL, realloc() behaves like malloc() and allocates a new object.
The free() function causes the space pointed to by ptr to be either placed on a list of free blocks to make it available for future allocation or, when appropriate, to be returned to the kernel using munmap(2). If ptr is NULL, no action occurs. If ptr was previously freed by free() or a reallocation function, the behavior is undefined and the double free is a security concern.
Designed for safe allocation of arrays, the reallocarray() function is similar to realloc() except it operates on nmemb members of size size and checks for integer overflow in the calculation nmemb * size.
Used for the allocation of memory holding sensitive data, the recallocarray() and freezero() functions guarantee that memory becoming unallocated is explicitly discarded, meaning pages of memory are disposed via munmap(2) and cached free objects are cleared with explicit_bzero(3).
The recallocarray() function is similar to reallocarray() except it ensures newly allocated memory is cleared similar to calloc(). If ptr is NULL, oldnmemb is ignored and the call is equivalent to calloc(). If ptr is not NULL, oldnmemb must be a value such that oldnmemb * size is the size of the earlier allocation that returned ptr, otherwise the behaviour is undefined.
The freezero() function is similar to the free() function except it ensures memory is explicitly discarded. If ptr is NULL, no action occurs. If ptr is not NULL, the size argument must be equal or smaller than the size of the earlier allocation that returned ptr. freezero() guarantees the memory range starting at ptr with length size is discarded while deallocating the whole object originally allocated.

Upon successful completion, the allocation functions return a pointer to the allocated space; otherwise, NULL is returned and errno is set to ENOMEM.
If nmemb or size is equal to 0, a unique pointer to an access protected, zero sized object is returned. Access via this pointer will generate a SIGSEGV exception.
If multiplying nmemb and size results in integer overflow, calloc(), reallocarray() and recallocarray() return NULL and set errno to ENOMEM.
If ptr is not NULL and multiplying oldnmemb and size results in integer overflow recallocarray() returns NULL and sets errno to EINVAL.

Consider calloc() or the extensions reallocarray() and recallocarray() when there is multiplication in the size argument of malloc() or realloc(). For example, avoid this common idiom as it may lead to integer overflow: 
if ((p = malloc(num * size)) == NULL) 
	err(1, NULL);
A drop-in replacement is the OpenBSD extension reallocarray(): 
if ((p = reallocarray(NULL, num, size)) == NULL) 
	err(1, NULL);
Alternatively, calloc() may be used at the cost of initialization overhead.
When using realloc(), be careful to avoid the following idiom: 
size += 50; 
if ((p = realloc(p, size)) == NULL) 
	return (NULL);
Do not adjust the variable describing how much memory has been allocated until the allocation has been successful. This can cause aberrant program behavior if the incorrect size value is used. In most cases, the above sample will also result in a leak of memory. As stated earlier, a return value of NULL indicates that the old object still remains allocated. Better code looks like this: 
newsize = size + 50; 
if ((newp = realloc(p, newsize)) == NULL) { 
	free(p); 
	p = NULL; 
	size = 0; 
	return (NULL); 
} 
p = newp; 
size = newsize;
As with malloc(), it is important to ensure the new size value will not overflow; i.e. avoid allocations like the following: 
if ((newp = realloc(p, num * size)) == NULL) { 
	...
Instead, use reallocarray(): 
if ((newp = reallocarray(p, num, size)) == NULL) { 
	...
Calling realloc() with a NULL ptr is equivalent to calling malloc(). Instead of this idiom: 
if (p == NULL) 
	newp = malloc(newsize); 
else 
	newp = realloc(p, newsize);
Use the following: 
newp = realloc(p, newsize);
The recallocarray() function should be used for resizing objects containing sensitive data like keys. To avoid leaking information, it guarantees memory is cleared before placing it on the internal free list. Deallocation of such an object should be done by calling freezero().

 
 
String of flags documented in malloc.conf(5).

 
 
/etc/malloc.conf
Symbolic link to filename containing option flags.

If malloc() must be used with multiplication, be sure to test for overflow: 
size_t num, size; 
... 
 
/* Check for size_t overflow */ 
if (size && num > SIZE_MAX / size) 
	errc(1, EOVERFLOW, "overflow"); 
 
if ((p = malloc(num * size)) == NULL) 
	err(1, NULL);
The above test is not sufficient in all cases. For example, multiplying ints requires a different set of checks: 
int num, size; 
... 
 
/* Avoid invalid requests */ 
if (size < 0 || num < 0) 
	errc(1, EOVERFLOW, "overflow"); 
 
/* Check for signed int overflow */ 
if (size && num > INT_MAX / size) 
	errc(1, EOVERFLOW, "overflow"); 
 
if ((p = malloc(num * size)) == NULL) 
	err(1, NULL);
Assuming the implementation checks for integer overflow as OpenBSD does, it is much easier to use calloc(), reallocarray(), or recallocarray().
The above examples could be simplified to: 
if ((p = reallocarray(NULL, num, size)) == NULL) 
	err(1, NULL);
or at the cost of initialization: 
if ((p = calloc(num, size)) == NULL) 
	err(1, NULL);

If any of the functions detect an error condition, a message will be printed to file descriptor 2 (not using stdio). Errors will result in the process being aborted.
Here is a brief description of the error messages and what they mean:
 
 
“out of memory”
If the X option is specified it is an error for the allocation functions to return NULL.
 
 
“bogus pointer (double free?)”
An attempt to free() or reallocate an unallocated pointer was made.
 
 
“chunk is already free”
There was an attempt to free a chunk that had already been freed.
 
 
“use after free”
A chunk has been modified after it was freed.
 
 
“modified chunk-pointer”
The pointer passed to free() or a reallocation function has been modified.
 
 
“chunk canary corrupted address offset@length”
A byte after the requested size has been overwritten, indicating a heap overflow. The offset at which corruption was detected is printed before the @, and the requested length of the allocation after the @.
 
 
“recorded old size oldsize != size”
recallocarray() has detected that the given old size does not equal the recorded size in its meta data. Enabling option C allows recallocarray() to catch more of these cases.
 
 
“recursive call”
An attempt was made to call recursively into these functions, i.e., from a signal handler. This behavior is not supported. In particular, signal handlers should not use any of the malloc() functions nor utilize any other functions which may call malloc() (e.g., stdio(3) routines).
 
 
“unknown char in MALLOC_OPTIONS”
We found something we didn't understand.
 
 
any other error
malloc() detected an internal error; consult sources and/or wizards.

brk(2), mmap(2), munmap(2), alloca(3), getpagesize(3), posix_memalign(3), sysconf(3), malloc.conf(5)

The malloc(), calloc(), realloc(), and free() functions conform to ANSI X3.159-1989 (“ANSI C89”).
If nmemb or size are 0, the return value is implementation defined; other conforming implementations may return NULL in this case.
The MALLOC_OPTIONS environment variable, the file /etc/malloc.conf, and the DIAGNOSTICS output are extensions to the standard.

A free() internal kernel function and a predecessor to malloc(), alloc(), first appeared in Version 1 AT&T UNIX. C library functions alloc() and free() appeared in Version 6 AT&T UNIX. The functions malloc(), calloc(), and realloc() first appeared in Version 7 AT&T UNIX.
A new implementation by Chris Kingsley was introduced in 4.2BSD, followed by a complete rewrite by Poul-Henning Kamp which appeared in FreeBSD 2.2 and was included in OpenBSD 2.0. These implementations were all sbrk(2) based. In OpenBSD 3.8, Thierry Deval rewrote malloc to use the mmap(2) system call, making the page addresses returned by malloc random. A rewrite by Otto Moerbeek introducing a new central data structure and more randomization appeared in OpenBSD 4.4.
The reallocarray() function appeared in OpenBSD 5.6. The recallocarray() function appeared in OpenBSD 6.1. The freezero() function appeared in OpenBSD 6.2.

When using malloc(), be wary of signed integer and size_t overflow especially when there is multiplication in the size argument.
Signed integer overflow will cause undefined behavior which compilers typically handle by wrapping back around to negative numbers. Depending on the input, this can result in allocating more or less memory than intended.
An unsigned overflow has defined behavior which will wrap back around and return less memory than intended.
A signed or unsigned integer overflow is a security risk if less memory is returned than intended. Subsequent code may corrupt the heap by writing beyond the memory that was allocated. An attacker may be able to leverage this heap corruption to execute arbitrary code.
Consider using calloc(), reallocarray() or recallocarray() instead of using multiplication in malloc() and realloc() to avoid these problems on OpenBSD.
May 15, 2017 OpenBSD-current