|TCPD(8)||System Manager's Manual||TCPD(8)|
tcpd — tcp
wrappers access control facility for internet services
tcpd program can be set up to monitor
incoming requests for
comsat(8), and other services
that have a one-to-one mapping onto executable files.
Operation is as follows: whenever a request for service arrives,
the inetd(8) daemon is tricked
into running the
tcpd program instead of the desired
tcpd logs the request and does some
additional checks. When all is well,
tcpd runs the
appropriate server program and goes away.
Optional features are: pattern-based access control, client username lookups with the RFC 931 etc. protocol, protection against hosts that pretend to have someone else's host name, and protection against hosts that pretend to have someone else's network address.
Connections that are monitored by
reported through the
syslog(3) facility. Each
record contains a time stamp, the client host name and the name of the
requested service. The information can be useful to detect unwanted
activities, especially when logfile information from several hosts is
In order to find out where your logs are going, examine the syslog configuration file, usually /etc/syslog.conf.
tcpd supports a simple form of
access control that is based on pattern matching. The access-control
software provides hooks for the execution of shell commands when a pattern
fires. For details, see the
The authentication scheme of some protocols (rsh(1)) relies on host names. Some implementations believe the host name that they get from any random name server; other implementations are more careful but use a flawed algorithm.
tcpd verifies the client host name that is
returned by the address->name DNS server by looking at the host name and
address that are returned by the name->address DNS server. If any
discrepancy is detected,
tcpd concludes that it is
dealing with a host that pretends to have someone elses host name.
tcpd disables source-routing
socket options on every connection that it deals with. This will take care
of most attacks from hosts that pretend to have an address that belongs to
someone else's network. UDP services do not benefit from this protection.
This feature must be turned on at compile-time.
When RFC 931 etc. lookups are enabled (compile-time option)
tcpd will attempt to establish the name of the
client user. This will succeed only if the client host runs an RFC
931-compliant daemon. Client user name lookups will not work for
datagram-oriented connections, and may cause noticeable delays in the case
of connections from PCs.
The default locations of the host access control tables are:
This example applies when
that the network daemons are left in their original place, as it is
configured within OpenBSD.
finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/libexec/fingerd fingerd
finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/libexec/tcpd fingerd
Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to
be covered by
tcpd. Send a `kill -HUP´ to the
inetd(8) process to make the
In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret" or otherwise), edit the inetd(8) configuration file so that it specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example:
ntalk dgram udp wait root /usr/libexec/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd
Only the last component (
ntalkd) of the
pathname will be used for access control and logging.
Wietse Venema (email@example.com), Department of Mathematics and Computing Science, Eindhoven University of Technology Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
Some UDP (and RPC) daemons linger around for a while after they have finished their work, in case another request comes in. In the inetd configuration file these services are registered with the wait option. Only the request that started such a daemon will be logged.
RPC broadcast requests (for example: rwall(1), rup(1), rusers(1)) always appear to come from the responding host. What happens is that the client broadcasts the request to all portmap(8) daemons on its network; each portmap(8) daemon forwards the request to a local daemon. As far as the rwalld(8) etc. daemons know, the request comes from the local host.
|May 31, 2007||OpenBSD-5.1|