|DTLSV1_LISTEN(3)||Library Functions Manual||DTLSV1_LISTEN(3)|
struct sockaddr *peer);
DTLSv1_listen() listens for new incoming DTLS connections. If a ClientHello is received that does not contain a cookie, then
DTLSv1_listen() responds with a HelloVerifyRequest. If a ClientHello is received with a cookie that is verified, then control is returned to user code to enable the handshake to be completed (for example by using SSL_accept(3)).
DTLSv1_listen() is currently implemented
as a macro.
Datagram based protocols can be susceptible to Denial of Service attacks. A DTLS attacker could, for example, submit a series of handshake initiation requests that cause the server to allocate state (and possibly perform cryptographic operations) thus consuming server resources. The attacker could also (with UDP) quite simply forge the source IP address in such an attack.
As a counter measure to that DTLS includes a stateless cookie mechanism. The idea is that when a client attempts to connect to a server it sends a ClientHello message. The server responds with a HelloVerifyRequest which contains a unique cookie. The client then resends the ClientHello, but this time includes the cookie in the message thus proving that the client is capable of receiving messages sent to that address. All of this can be done by the server without allocating any state, and thus without consuming expensive resources.
OpenSSL implements this capability via the
DTLSv1_listen() function. The
ssl parameter should be a newly allocated
SSL object with its read and write BIOs set, in the
same way as might be done for a call to
SSL_accept(3). Typically the read BIO
will be in an "unconnected" state and thus capable of receiving
messages from any peer.
When a ClientHello is received that contains a cookie that has
been verified, then
DTLSv1_listen() will return with
the ssl parameter updated into a state where the
handshake can be continued by a call to (for example)
SSL_accept(3). Additionally the
struct sockaddr pointed to by
peer will be filled in with details of the peer that
sent the ClientHello. It is the calling code's responsibility to ensure that
the peer location is sufficiently large to accommodate
the addressing scheme in use. For example this might be done by allocating
space for a struct sockaddr_storage and casting the
pointer to it to a struct sockaddr * for the call to
DTLSv1_listen(). Typically user code is expected to
"connect" the underlying socket to the peer and continue the
handshake in a connected state.
Prior to calling
DTLSv1_listen() user code
must ensure that cookie generation and verification callbacks have been set
DTLSv1_listen() operates entirely
statelessly whilst processing incoming ClientHellos, it is unable to process
fragmented messages (since this would require the allocation of state). An
implication of this is that
supports ClientHellos that fit inside a single datagram.
A return value of 0 indicates a non-fatal error. This could (for
example) be because of non-blocking IO, or some invalid message having been
received from a peer. Errors may be placed on the OpenSSL error queue with
further information if appropriate. Typically user code is expected to retry
the call to
DTLSv1_listen() in the event of a
non-fatal error. Any old errors on the error queue will be cleared in the
A return value of <0 indicates a fatal error. This could (for example) be because of a failure to allocate sufficient memory for the operation.
Prior to OpenSSL 1.1.0 fatal and non-fatal errors both produce return codes <= 0 (in typical implementations user code treats all errors as non-fatal), whilst return codes >0 indicate success.BIO_new(3), ssl(3), SSL_accept(3), SSL_get_error(3)
DTLSv1_listen() first appeared in OpenSSL 0.9.8m and has been available since OpenBSD 4.9.
|March 27, 2018||OpenBSD-current|