listen for incoming DTLS
struct sockaddr *peer);
listens for new incoming DTLS connections. If a ClientHello is received that
does not contain a cookie, then
responds with a HelloVerifyRequest. If a ClientHello is received with a
cookie that is verified, then control is returned to user code to enable the
handshake to be completed (for example by using
is currently implemented as a macro.
Datagram based protocols can be susceptible to Denial of Service attacks. A DTLS attacker could, for example, submit a series of handshake initiation requests that cause the server to allocate state (and possibly perform cryptographic operations) thus consuming server resources. The attacker could also (with UDP) quite simply forge the source IP address in such an attack.
As a counter measure to that DTLS includes a stateless cookie mechanism. The idea is that when a client attempts to connect to a server it sends a ClientHello message. The server responds with a HelloVerifyRequest which contains a unique cookie. The client then resends the ClientHello, but this time includes the cookie in the message thus proving that the client is capable of receiving messages sent to that address. All of this can be done by the server without allocating any state, and thus without consuming expensive resources.
OpenSSL implements this capability via the
function. The ssl parameter should be a newly
allocated SSL object with its read and write BIOs set,
in the same way as might be done for a call to
SSL_accept(3). Typically the read BIO will be in an
"unconnected" state and thus capable of receiving messages from
When a ClientHello is received that contains
a cookie that has been verified, then
will return with the ssl parameter updated into a
state where the handshake can be continued by a call to (for example)
SSL_accept(3). Additionally the struct sockaddr
pointed to by peer will be filled in with details of
the peer that sent the ClientHello. It is the calling code's responsibility
to ensure that the peer location is sufficiently large
to accommodate the addressing scheme in use. For example this might be done
by allocating space for a struct sockaddr_storage and
casting the pointer to it to a struct sockaddr * for
the call to
DTLSv1_listen(). Typically user code is
expected to "connect" the underlying socket to the peer and
continue the handshake in a connected state.
Prior to calling
user code must ensure that cookie generation and verification callbacks have
been set up using
operates entirely statelessly whilst processing incoming ClientHellos, it is
unable to process fragmented messages (since this would require the
allocation of state). An implication of this is that
DTLSv1_listen() only supports ClientHellos that fit
inside a single datagram.
From OpenSSL 1.1.0 a return value of >= 1 indicates success. In this instance the peer value will be filled in and the ssl object set up ready to continue the handshake.
A return value of 0 indicates a non-fatal error. This could (for
example) be because of non-blocking IO, or some invalid message having been
received from a peer. Errors may be placed on the OpenSSL error queue with
further information if appropriate. Typically user code is expected to retry
the call to
DTLSv1_listen() in the event of a
non-fatal error. Any old errors on the error queue will be cleared in the
A return value of <0 indicates a fatal error. This could (for example) be because of a failure to allocate sufficient memory for the operation.
Prior to OpenSSL 1.1.0 fatal and non-fatal errors both produce return codes <= 0 (in typical implementations user code treats all errors as non-fatal), whilst return codes >0 indicate success.
BIO_new(3), ssl(3), SSL_accept(3), SSL_get_error(3)
DTLSv1_listen() first appeared in OpenSSL
0.9.8m and has been available since OpenBSD 4.9.